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In recent, years, the Organisation for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) has repeatedly addressed, in a variety of
forms, the problem of transnational corporate concentration. In the field of
restrictive business practices, it has made suggestions on specific antitrust
problems, issued council recommendations, and promulgated the 1976 Con-
cil Guidelines for multinational enterprises. Not surprisingly for an organisa-
tion that adheres to the principle of unanimity and, consequently, is gov-
erned by the law of the smallest common denominator, these efforts have
thus far focused more on procedure than on substance. Even where quasi-
substantive rules have been adopted, such as in competition guideline 1(a),'
the "rules" tend to be lenient compared with stricter national antitrust laws
like those of the United States and Germany. A structural approach to the
problem of concentration, similar to Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the
German merger law, has not had a great chance of adoption in the OECD.
The reason is simply that most member countries still feel that flexible,
conduct-oriented solutions are more appropriate.
Still, it would be rash to underestimate the importance of OECD efforts
in this field. Particularly noteworthy are such procedural achievements as the
1967 and 1973 Recommendations on international cooperation, both now
replaced by the consolidated Recommendation of 1979.2 Although the 1967
Recommendation was not specifically intended to address transnational cor-
porate concentration, it was highly relevant to the problem since the recom-
mended procedures were, and under the 1979 Recommendation continue to
be, applied in transnational merger cases.
To obtain a complete picture of OECD activity in this field, it is not
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sufficient to concentrate upon competition guideline 1(a) and corresponding
section (1)(a) of the 1978 Recommendation concerning multinationals, 3 or
the substantive suggestions in the OECD report on mergers.4 Rather, compe-
tition guideline 4, the recommendations on cooperation with multinationals
regarding restrictive business pracitices, is also relevant. The following analy-
sis embraces this broader approach.
Before embarking on this analysis, it is helpful to describe briefly the
mechanics of OECD activity. Actions of the OECD in the field of competi-
tion originate generally in the OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive
Business Practices (Committee) and its working parties. This Committee, in
existence almost since the beginning of the OECD itself, has the authority
to examine and comment upon particular competition problems and to re-
port and make recommendations as appropriate to the OECD Council
(Council) on matters within its competence. 5 Its studies on specific prob-
lems often result in published reports providing "suggestions for action"
and/or in draft Council recommendations, which when adopted by the
OECD Council, are addressed to member countries. Suggestions for action
in such reports do not formally involve the Council even though the Coun-
cil has to approve of reports of the Committee of Experts. Council recom-
mendations are more formal and have a greater political weight in OECD
usage. The OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises do engage the
OECD Council but are addressed to enterprises, not member countries as
with recommendations.
The first instance of a more than passing reference to some aspects of
transnational corporate concentration is to be found in the report by the
secretary general on inflation of December 1970.6 This report discusses the
issue of multinational corporate market power in the context of an effective
competition policy as a method to fight inflation. It exposes multinationals
and their market power as one of the more serious problems in the field of
inflation, noting that acquisition by corporate merger is one route to such
market power. However, the report does not limit its suggestions for action to
market power acquired by external growth. Legislative action is advocated
not only against undesirable mergers, but also against concentration of mar-
ket power in general. In consequence of the secretary general's report on
inflation, the OECD Council adopted a recommendation concerning action
against inflation in the field of competition policy.7 This nonbinding recom-
mendation addressed to member countries cautiously advised governments,
without specific reference to international restraints of competition or legisla-
tion, "to examine the advisability of adopting" effective provisions against the
harmful practices of monopolies and oligopolies as well as against undesir-
able mergers and concentrations of enterprises which limit competition un-
duly. Both the suggestions for action in the secretary general's report and the
recommendation seem to have been used in support of the national legisla-
tion generally strengthening competition laws.
Subsequently, the OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business
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Practices decided to examine more fully the problem of national and interna-
tional corporate concentration, and thus established a working party on
mergers. The working party's effort resulted in an OECD report on mergers,
published in 1975.8 After a careful analysis of the available data, the report
concluded that transnational corporate concentration may have both benefi-
cial and detrimental effects on national economic welfare and competition. In
its suggestions for action, the report does not distinguish, in principle, be-
tween forms of national and transnational concentration; 9 rather, it recom-
mends that as transnational concentrations raise particularly difficult pro-
cedural problems, member countries should utilize the OECD procedures on
international cooperation, consultation, and conciliation.'
The next, and thus far most spectacular, action relevant to transnational
corporate concentration occurred in June 1976 when the OECD Council
adopted a Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enter-
prises. This declaration recommended a set of "Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises" as well as intergovernmental consultation procedures applicable
to these guidelines." The guidelines cover, inter alia, general business poli-
cies, disclosure of information, and competitive practices. Those three (of
seven) sections include provisions which touch directly or indirectly upon
problems of transnational corporate concentration.
These guidelines are nonbinding standards of conduct or, in the words
of the introductory paragraphs, recommendations jointly addressed by mem-
ber countries to multinational enterprises operating in their territories.
12
Observance of these guidelines "is voluntary and not legally enforceable."
Their objective is "to ensure that the operations of these enterprises are in
harmony with national policies of the countries where they operate and to
strengthen the basis of mutual confidence between enterprises and States."
The introduction provides that every state retains the right to prescribe the
conditions under which multinational enterprises operate within its national
jurisdiction; moreover, the different entities of a multinational enterprise are
subject to the laws of the countries within which they transact business.'"
As with the suggestions for action relating to the fight against inflation
and undesirable mergers, the guidelines refrain from introducing specific
substantive rules for multinational enterprises. The introduction explicitly
states that guidelines "are not aimed at introducing differences of treatment
between national and domestic enterprises"; rather, these enterprises "are
subject to the same expectations in respect to their conduct wherever the
guidelines are relevant to both."' 4 In light of this principle of nondiscrimina-
tion, the deliberate absence in the introductory statement of a precise legal
definition of multinational enterprise is workable. 15
The first and only quasi-substantive guideline directly relevant to trans-
national corporate concentration reads:
Enterprises should, while conforming to official competition rules and
established policies of the countries in which they operate,
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1. refrain from actions which would adversely affect competition in the
relevant market by abusing a dominant position of market power, by
means of, for example
a) anticompetitive acquisitions.... 16
The first point requiring interpretation is the word enterprise. It means pri-
marily, of course, "multinational enterprise," although, as stated in paragraph
nine of the introduction,'7 the guidelines reflect "good practice for all." In the
light of paragraph eight of the introduction it seems clear that the nature of
the ownership is irrelevant; it may be private, public, mixed, or state owner-
ship.' 8 Less clear is whether the multinational enterprise in toto, including
its various subsidiaries and branches located in different countries in differ-
ent legal forms, is the addressee of this guideline, or whether these individu-
ally located entities are each addressees. Although somewhat enigmatic, 19 the
introductory phrases seem to favor the second alternative:
[Tihe guidelines are addressed to the various entities within the multi-
national enterprise (parent companies and/or local entities) according to
the actual distribution of responsibilities among them as the under-
standing that they will co-operate and provide assistance to one another
as necessary to facilitate observance of the guidelines. The word "enter-
prise" as used in these guidelines refers to these various entities in
accordance with their responsibilities.
Thus, in spite of being addressed in principle to the various entities, the
criterion for the applicability of the guideline seems to be business "responsi-
bility." Although the guidelines do not offer a definition of responsibility,
interpreting this term as being, among other things, similar to the notion of
"control" or "independent decision making authority" would lead to accept-
able results. A subsidiary whose pricing policies were controlled by a parent
would not be responsible for these prices and not an addressee of the compe-
tition guidelines on pricing. If this is true, it is difficult to follow Hawk when
he states that the guidelines do not adopt the "highly controversial and ill-
defined intraenterprise or 'bathtub' conspiracy doctrine."2 That the guide-
lines do not distinguish between operations through a branch or division and
operations through a separately incorporated subsidiary does not necessarily
support his conclusion.2' The use of the criterion "responsibility" makes an
explicit distinction superfluous: branches and divisions are not responsible
but subsidiaries may be, according to the circumstances and the degree of
control by the parent company. One may conclude that the guidelines, with-
out explicitly deciding this question, may be interpreted along the lines of the
"bathtub conspiracy doctrine" and may possibly approximate the "effective
working control" standard of the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Guide
for International Operations.22 The consequences of this interpretation are
of no primary importance in the context of transnational corporation concen-
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tration, but they may play a decisive role in other areas such as joint ven-
tures, which are treated by certain antitrust laws as restrictive agreements.2
The second element of the introductory wording of competition guide-
line 1 acknowledges the priority of the individual competition rules and poli-
cies of the countries in which the enterprises operate.24 The word operate
does not mean that the applicability of the guidelines is based on the "con-
duct principle" as opposed to the "effects doctrine" recognized by the major-
ity of OECD member countries with antitrust laws. 25 This issue, which is
highly contested among OECD member countries, was deliberately left open
in the guidelines.
The third criterion a multinational corporation must meet in order to be an
addressee of competition guideline 1(a) is that of "dominant position of market
power." The concept of controlling abuse of market power, although not en-
tirely unknown to U.S. law, is much more familiar to European antitrust
laws. 26 European Community practice under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty
illustrates the practical elements of this form of antitrust enforcement. 27 The
control of market power abuse is in practice similar to antitrust regulation
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. However, there are some basic differ-
ences in the scope of regulation between the Sherman Act and OECD compe-
tition guideline 1(a). In one respect, Section 2 of the Sherman Act is broader
than guideline 1(a) since Section 2 covers attempts to monopolize while the
guideline applies only if a dominant position of market power is already
present.' How this dominant market position is obtained is entirely irrelevant,
as for example in the EEC Treaty Article 86 and Section 22 of the German Act
Against Restraints of Competition. On the other hand, guideline 1(a) is
broader at least in theory, since its applicability does not necessarily turn upon
market share criteria.29 A dominant position of market power may be estab-
lished even if the enterprise holds only a small market share but commands
superior financial or marketing resources, or more factors of protection, par-
ticularly if the relevant market is held predominantly by small- or medium-
sized firms.
The fourth criterion is that the action in question has to affect competi-
tion in the "relevant market." Although the language is not without ambi-
guity, OECD member countries will probably interpret the term in the sense
that the effect has to be in the same relevant market in which the dominat-
ing position of market power is held.3" Otherwise, the words "in the relevant
market" would have little meaning; if anticompetitive effects would be suffi-
cient, irrespective of the market in which they occur, these words could have
been omitted.
The actions from which enterprises should refrain are such that "would
adversely affect competition." The guidelines do not offer any additional ex-
planation of these terms. In spite of divergent interpretations in different
OECD countries and the European Community, it is unlikely that this ele-
ment will create many practical difficulties. Furthermore, it can safely be
assumed that effects on competition that were merely theoretical would not
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be sufficient to find a violation of guideline 1(a); they would have to be at
least "perceptible" in the sense of EEC and German antitrust enforcement
practice.3 ' However, some countries might interpret competition guideline 1
as requiring "substantial" effects.
Any adverse effects on competition must be brought about by an
"abuse." Five subparagraphs give examples for types of abuses, this list being
explanatory and not exclusive. Hawk has already suggested that European
members of the OECD might interpret an abuse of a dominant position as
including practices not enumerated in the list;32 non-European members
might obviously do the same. In regard to concentration this means that not
only those forms of abuse falling under competition guideline 1(a), namely
anticompetitive acquisitions, are subject to the guideline, but also other
forms of external or internal growth not mentioned. Thus, it does not make
much sense to interpret the term acquisition narrowly. Davidow seems to
share this view when he deals with guideline 1(a) and assumes that it covers
"acquisitions and mergers."33 Guideline 1(a) certainly covers all forms of
external concentration such as horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate mer-
gers and acquisitions.
34
The qualification "anti-competitive" is not very meaningful if one ac-
cepts that the adverse effects on competition required by the introduction of
guideline 1 have to appear in the market in which the enterprise holds a
dominant position. The consequence of this requirement in the introductory
phrase is that vertical or conglomerate mergers having no adverse effects on
competition in the market in which the enterprise holds the dominant posi-
tion, but only in the market into which the acquiring corporation extends its
activities, do not fall under competition guideline 1(a) even though such
acquisitions or mergers are anticompetitive. In other words, the qualification
does not extend the scope of application of guideline 1(a), which covers only
such "anticompetitive" acquisitions which adversely affect competition in the
market dominated by the enterprise.
35
As in Section 7 of the Clayton Act, assessment of anticompetitive effects
of an acquisition requires a hypothetical analysis. While under the Clayton
Act it is sufficient that the merger may lessen competition, guideline 1(a)
requires that it would adversely affect competition.36 It seems clear that
guideline 1(a) requires a far higher degree of certainty of effect, with a
concomitant higher burden of proof and sufficiency of evidence. The criteria
to be used in this determination, however, are still unclear, that is, whether
the effects have to be expected beyond a reasonable doubt or whether a high
degree of likelihood would suffice.
An interesting question is whether any defenses can be raised in cases of
acquisitions. Davidow and Hawk37 are probably accurate in stating that the
regular defenses are implicit in competition guideline 1. This conclusion,
however, should not be made, as Hawk seems to do, from the "anticompeti-
tive" qualification in guideline 1(a) since it is redundant. Rather, this conclu-
sion can be deduced from the "adversely affect competition" requirement in
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the introductory phrase or perhaps even from the "abuse" criterion. Thus,
under the first alternative a valid failing company defense would be premised
upon the argument that the acquisition does not adversely affect competition
in the dominated market. Under the second alternative, it could be argued
that the acquisition of a "failing company"-one which would no longer be a
competitor-does not constitute an abuse.
To conclude the discussion of guideline 1(a), it is quite correct to esti-
mate that no direct and important effects are to be expected, particularly in
those countries applying stricter and structure-oriented national merger
laws.3" Still, as a policy statement of the OECD the guideline has a certain
value, either as a symbol, a model, or as a clear articulation of a perceived
problem, especially in those member countries which have not yet intro-
duced merger control.
The second quasi-substantive competition guideline relevant for transna-
tional corporate concentration is guideline 3:
Enterprises should, while conforming to official competition rules and
established policies of the countries in which they operate ... refrain
from participating in or otherwise purposely strengthening the restric-
tive effects of international or domestic cartels or restrictive agreements
which adversely affect or eliminate competition and which are not gen-
erally or specifically accepted under applicable national or international
legislation.
39
This guideline dealing with cartels and other restrictive agreements may
be of particular interest for those countries, and the European Community,
which do not yet have specific merger legislation. One means of attempting
some control over external concentration is to interpret prohibitions of re-
strictive agreements broadly, for example, by regarding joint ventures as
such agreements. A practical illustration of this possibility is afforded by the
European Community's practice on joint ventures.4 ° Increasingly, the Euro-
pean Community administration tends to regard joint ventures as cartels
under Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty that prohibits restrictive agreements.
This has been done in part by extending the procedural application of Article
85 more and more to transactions which were already considered concentra-
tions in other countries. Someone familiar with this practice may find it
adequate to deal with joint ventures under competition guideline 3. Other
examples can be found in national antitrust laws, such as those of the United
States, that apply merger control under certain circumstances to prevent
restrictive agreements in joint ventures.4' In Germany, the relationship be-
tween the ban on cartels, Section 1 of the Act against Restraints of Competi-
tion (ARC) and merger control Section 23 et seq. ARC, is still in debate; one
view is that at least as to certain forms of joint ventures, Section 1 ARC
applies either simultaneously with Sections 23 ff., or even exclusively.4 2 In
this context, it does not seem necessary to go into all the delicate problems of
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interpreting this guideline but rather to concentrate on those aspects which
would make it possible for certain forms of transnational corporate concentra-
tion such as joint ventures to be measured under diverging standards, de-
pending on whether they are assessed under guideline 1(a) or 3.
A first and quite important difference is that guideline 1(a) applies only
when market domination is already present, while guideline 3 has no such
requirement. Consequently, under guideline 3, joint ventures may be found
objectionable when classical concentrations do not rise to the level of control
under guideline 1(a).
A second question arises in connection with the words "or otherwise
purposely strengthening the restrictive effects of" as opposed to "participating
in" international or domestic cartels. While guideline 1(a) applies clearly only
to those participating in a merger, or, more precisely, to those participants
which hold a market-dominating position, guideline 3 also applies to third
parties. However, the broad wording of guideline 3 must be interpreted nar-
rowly,4 3 certainly in regard to concentrations. The drafters of this text did not
intend to subject specific forms of concentration to a more rigorous regime of
regulation without some showing of general anticompetitive effects beyond
those associated with classical forms of concentration. Joint ventures are, in
general, no more anticompetitive than takeovers. The wording, however,
leaves no choice; any interpretation that prevented application of guideline 3
to those other than the participants would be clearly incompatible with the ex-
press wording of the guideline and, therefore, is beyond the limits of interpre-
tation. In order to reconcile guidelines 1(a) and 3 insofar as corporate concen-
tration is concerned, an acceptable solution might be to interpret "purposely
strengthening" as referring to the predominant aim of third party conduct.
One must show that the predominant aim of the third party is to further the
restrictive effects of the concentrative agreements; conduct alone which has
such an effect, even if foreseen and substantial, is insufficient. In other words,
a showing of intent and purpose to foster a restrictive result is necessary.
The difference in wording in regard to the effects test under guideline
1(a)--"which would adversely affect competition," and guideline 3--"which
adversely affect or eliminate competition," are of no material significance.
The explicit reference to the elimination of competition in guideline 3 does
not imply that an acquisition eliminating competition would not also fall
within the "adversely affect competition" standard found in guideline 1(a).
Moreover, the difference between "would affect" in guideline l(a) and "af-
fect" in guideline 3 does not constitute a material distinction. It appears that
both guidelines require anticompetitive effects either to be present or to be
expected beyond a reasonable doubt or certain degree of probability. The
required degree of proof to be applied with guideline 3 remains as uncertain
as with guideline L"4
Guideline 3, unlike guideline 1(a), contains a reservation exempting
from its coverage agreements "which are not generally or specifically ac-
cepted under applicable national or international legislation." This qualifica-
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tion referring to the various exemptions granted certain cartels found in
national antitrust laws, such as export cartels, import cartels, rationalization
cartels, and crisis cartels, is arguably already covered by the introductory
sentence "while conforming to official competition rules... of the countries
in which they operate." Enterprises engaging in a joint venture falling under
a specialization exemption are in compliance with national competition
rules,45 and thus are also in compliance with guideline 3. This qualification
reemphasizes that member countries remain free to establish as many ex-
emptions from the ban of restrictive agreements as they wish and, therefore,
may permit corporate concentration, both national and transnational, in order
to effectuate other economic or social policies. It is not clear that the clause
should be considered redundant as regards internationally accepted agree-
ments. If the qualification in guideline 3 were to be deleted, however, the
OECD member countries that were also members of the European Commu-
nity would in all likelihood subsume an agreement exempted by Article 85(3)
of the EEC Treaty under "official competition rules... of the countries in
which they operate." Therefore, the qualification found in guideline 3 does
not restrict its scope of application beyond the limits already established by
the introductory phrase and the general prevalence of national legislation
over the OECD guidelines.
Competition guideline 4 reads:
Enterprises should, while conforming to official competition rules and
established policies of the countries in which they operate ... be ready
to consult and cooperate, including the provision of information with
competent authorities of countries whose interests are directly affected
in regard to competition issues or investigations. Provision of informa-
tion should be in accordance with safeguards normally applicable in
this field.
46
In contrast to guidelines 1 through 3, competition guideline 4 deals with
procedural problems, doing so in a general fashion and not specifically in
regard to problems of transnational corporate concentration. Still, this guide-
line deserves comment, since dealing with transnational concentration at the
OECD level will for a long time be a predominantly procedural problem.
Even in the European Community, the probability that an enforceable
merger control regulation will be adopted is small. In other international
organizations, including the OECD, the chances of such action are even
smaller.
To a certain extent, guideline 4 adopts language already used in the
OECD recommendations of 1967 and 1973 concerning cooperation, consul-
tation, and conciliation in the field of restrictive business practices affecting
international trade. 47 In contrast to these recommendations that are ad-
dressed to member governments, guideline 4 addresses enterprises.
Guideline 4 contains various complex prerequisites and, to some extent,
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this complexity decreases the danger of this guideline being continuously
invoked by antitrust authorities in their dealings with transnational corpora-
tions.48 The general requirement "to be ready to consult and to co-operate" is
no more than an appeal to make life somewhat less difficult for antitrust
officials. Similar appeals in the context of national antitrust proceedings may
have a different significance, since unlike the OECD guidelines, in such
proceedings there are very real sanctions available against obstreperous en-
terprises and real benefits to be gained through cooperation.
The situation could be somewhat different in regard to the provision of
information which guideline 4 mentions as one of the forms of cooperation.
That the provision of information is the main issue becomes evident by
reading the second sentence of this guideline. First, I agree with Hawk49 and
Davidow, 50 that "to be ready to provide information" goes beyond legal obliga-
tions under existing national laws. This was the prevailing view during the
discussions in the working party on multinationals.
Guideline 4 requires cooperation with authorities of "countries whose
interests are directly affected." As other scholars have correctly pointed out,5,
this covers authorities of countries in which the enterprises concerned have
neither a subsidiary nor a branch office. One should not overestimate the
impact of this seemingly sweeping provision. If an enterprise has no subsidi-
ary or branch office in the country concerned, there are not many sanctions
available to enforce a request for information based solely on competition
guideline 4.
Admittedly, sentence 2 of guideline 4 is vague and ambiguous. In spite
of this, Hawk seems to overestimate the potential danger of this mandate for
affected enterprises. On the contrary, any enumeration of special safeguards
such as business secret, professional secret, and others, probably would have
been more dangerous. The reference to safeguards "normally applicable" was
meant to preclude any loopholes. "Normally applicable" does not mean that
there must be a consensus among OECD member countries about the valid-
ity and applicability of a special safeguard. Rather, it merely indicates that
the safeguards normally applicable under the applicable national laws (that
is, the laws of the countries in which the enterprise possessing the informa-
tion and the authority requesting the information are located) shall also be
available without reservation if guideline 4 is invoked.
The OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises contain some further
guidelines relevant for competition. The most important in this context is
guideline 3 of the "General Policies" chapter5 2 which overlaps in part with
competition guideline 4, and is simultaneously applicable with competition
guideline 4.
General policy guideline 3 is somewhat limited inasmuch as it is con-
cerned only with the provision of information and not with consultation and
cooperation. It is also narrow since it deals only with information requested
by the authorities of a country in which the addressee enterprise has a
subsidiary or branch. However, this guideline contains a broader mandate
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insofar as it requires that certain information be divulged to interested au-
thorities, as well as to those entities of the enterprise that operate within the
particular national jurisdiction. There are a number of ambiguities and un-
certainties involved. According to the wording of this guideline it appears
that multinationals are expected to go beyond their legal obligations. How-
ever, it is unclear whether the particular entity facing the request for infor-
mation is under the same obligation. Furthermore, the only safeguard explic-
itly mentioned is business confidentiality; it is not certain that the others
which are clearly covered by competition guideline 4 are equally applicable.
The chapter dealing with "disclosure of information" may also become
relevant to transnational corporate concentration. 53 Much of the information
to be provided by enterprises under this chapter is relevant for merger con-
trol, for example information about the structure of an enterprise, ownership
percentage, areas of activities, sales, and investments. The information
gathered pursuant to this guideline will be published annually. However, in
practice, the burden to the enterprises of providing the requested information
will be limited by two principal factors-the costs of collection and publica-
tion of the information, and the rules on business confidentiality. These
guidelines should not create a greater burden for enterprises than disclosure
requirements under competition guideline 4. There are other guidelines also
relevant for competition issues, but which have no direct significance for
transnational corporate concentration, such as guideline 2 on taxation and
intraenterprise transfer pricing. It should be noted, of course, that regulation
of intraenterprise activities may well foster or hinder concentration.
For matters related to the OECD guidelines for multinational enter-
prises, in 1976 the OECD Council adopted a decision establishing an inter-
governmental consultation procedure.5 4 In the field of competition, a ques-
tion arises immediately as to the relationship of this procedure, administered
essentially by the Committee on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises (IME), to the specific cooperation, consultation, and conciliation
procedures in the field of restrictive business practices affecting international
trade. Today, the question remains the same as in 1976, that is, whether the
consultation and other procedural requirements of one set of guidelines pre-
clude the application of requirements pursuant to OECD decisions. The 1967
and 1973 recommendations regulating these procedures have been consoli-
dated by a new recommendation of 1979 5 without changing their substance
or administration by the OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Busi-
ness Practices. There is no explicit answer to this question in either proce-
dure. It appears that both procedures may, in principle, be used in the same
case; there is no general priority for one or the other. A transnational merger
case may thus lead to consultations under the 1979 Recommendation as well
as under paragraph four of the 1976 intergovernmental consultation proce-
dure, provided the proposed merger subjects the interested corporate entities
to conflicting requirements under national laws. Although the intergovern-
mental consultation procedure is, as regards competition, more narrowly fo-
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cused than the 1979 restrictive business practices procedure, it is not exclu-
sive in the sense that issues falling within the guidelines are the exclusive
concern of the IME Committee. It is open to argument which procedure
would be more practical to utilize in a specific case. Nothing precludes the
same case being negotiated and examined by both committees at the same
time. Moreover, the theoretical risk of divergent results could probably be
avoided by a minimum of coordination within the OECD.
The OECD report on multinational enterprises under competition policy
aspects published in 197756 contains a number of cautious and balanced
suggestions for action, some of which are relevant to transnational corporate
concentration. They have been taken into account in the 1978 Council Rec-
ommendation on restrictive business practices of multinational enterprises
7
The Council Recommendation adopted in 1978, as well as the report
upon which it was based was prepared by the Restrictive Business Practices
Committee and its Working Group on multinationals. In regard to its quasi-
substantive recommendations the Business Practices Committee kept very
close to the competition guidelines. Most differences in regard to the two
quasi-substantive rules-guidelines l(a) and 3 on the one hand and recom-
mendations (1)(a) line 1 and (1)(b) on the other hand-can be explained by
the simple fact that guidelines are addressed to enterprises while the 1978
Recommendation is addressed to governments. Accordingly, (1)(a), instead
of requesting that the governments "refrain from certain actions," recom-
mends that they "adopt new or supplement existing measures" to "prohibit or
control effectively such practices." In substance, the requirements suggested
in regard to acquisitions are the same as those contained in guideline
(1)(a).58
With respect to cartels, though the wording of guideline 3 differs more
greatly from recommendation 1(b) than do the measures discussed in the
preceding paragraph, there is no implication of substantive differences be-
tween the two. The recommendation suggests action against "cartels or other
restrictive agreements" without any reference to activities of nonparticipants
that purposely strengthen the restrictive effect of such agreements; however,
this does not limit remedial action to measures that seek to ensure free
participation. On the contrary, a measure to effectively control cartels could
also be directed against outsiders that purposely strengthen the restrictive
agreement or cartel.5 9 Furthermore, the term cartels or other restrictive
agreements encompasses both national and international agreements explic-
itly enumerated in this guideline.
The more troublesome difference between guideline 3 and recommenda-
tion 1(b) pertains to the safeguard clauses in each instrument. Guideline 3
conditions improper agreements on the basis of those "generally or specifi-
cally accepted under applicable national or international legislation"; the rec-
ommendation refers only to agreements "without justification." Without be-
ing familiar with the history of both the guideline and the recommendation,
one would be inclined to seek different interpretations. However, the drafters
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of both texts intended the guideline and recommendation to cover all possible
exemptions to general cartel prohibitions afforded by national and interna-
tional legislation. Both clauses were intended to cover general and specific
exceptions that exist in law, as well as those for which enterprises must show
good cause before enforcement or judicial authorities can grant an exception.
The following recommendations (2) to (5)60 are procedural and based on
the report on multinationals. Each may play a role when governments deal
with the problem of transnational corporate concentration. These recommen-
dations call upon member countries to improve their antitrust procedures, to
cooperate in disclosing information, and to lend aid for effective national
antitrust enforcement. They suggest that this cooperation can best be
achieved through additional bilateral and multilateral agreements as well as
through further use of existing OECD procedures.
It should be noted that substantial importance has been attributed to the
Working Party's note accompanying the draft on competition submitted to
the IME Committee.6 It has been suggested by Hawk62 that this note should
be kept in mind in interpreting the competition guidelines. This suggestion
certainly was proper until the Council adopted the 1978 Recommendation
prepared by the same expert groups that had prepared the guidelines. The
note, no doubt, remains valid as to its general statements about the limited
amount of information on the role of multinationals in national and interna-
tional competition.
Although competition guidelines 1(a) and 3 are in substance identical to
recommendations 1(a) and (b), this does not necessarily indicate that the
Working Party has given up its specific caveat in the interpretative note:
namely, that "standards of behaviour dealing with difficult legal and eco-
nomic concepts such as abuse of market power [and] adverse effects on
competition... do not in themselves provide simple rules for business execu-
tives to follow in all circumstances." This reservation remains valid because
of the difference in quality between guidelines for enterprises and recom-
mendations for governments. The practical value of guidelines addressed to
enterprises may be seriously compromised by the vague and ambiguous na-
ture of the mandate they contain; in contrast, the vagueness of recommenda-
tions for governmental action will have less impact upon their practical and
political value.
The final OECD instrument to be briefly examined is entirely procedu-
ral. In the field of competition, the procedure set forth in the 1979 Council
Recommendation Concerning Cooperation between member countries is the
most important achievement of OECD.63 The part of this procedure dealing
with cooperation is likely to be successful since it is practically identical to
the 1967 Recommendation, under which cooperation took place with respect
to a substantial number of transnational mergers. There is no reason why
this should change. On the contrary, the consolidation of the 1967 and 1973
procedures may lead to more frequent consultations between antitrust au-
thorities in international merger cases and on problems of transnational cor-
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porate concentration. As to the part on conciliation, this result seems to be
less likely, because the conciliation part of the 1973 Recommendation has
never been applied.
CONCLUSION
It can be seen that OECD activity with respect to competition policy has
primarily been in the area of restrictive business practices-indicating the
adoption of what is principally a behavioral approach to the control of multi-
national enterprises. Though aware of the problems of multinational corpo-
rate concentration, the OECD has not thus far taken direct measures with a
structural approach as such.
In discerning the reasons for this past tendency toward behavioral rather
than structural measures, it must be remembered that OECD efforts are
significantly influenced by the principle of unanimity,64 and therefore tend to
represent the least common denominator among the member countries.
OECD decisions are usually made by mutual agreement. This principle ap-
plies a well to the OECD committees and working parties such as the Com-
mittee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices.
65
Accordingly, it is important to recognize that less than a third of the
OECD member countries have adopted any structurally based approach to
merger control.66 Moreover, enforcement in these countries with structural
merger control laws does not always appear wholehearted. Until recently, the
member nations have evidenced different attitudes toward the relative bene-
fits and liabilities of corporate concentration, and thus have differed consid-
erably in their attitudes toward regulation of industrial structure. Indeed,
some European nations, for example the United Kingdom and France, have
in the past actively supported the concentration of economic power in large
national corporations.
Thus, the adoption of clear, structure-oriented recommendations should
not be expected from the OECD within the next few years. However, it
would be a mistake to ignore the influence of the OECD activity in this area
since national legislators naturally look to OECD activity when contemplat-
ing modification of national regulatory mechanisms. Moreover, the changing
political climate in the various member countries with respect to corporate
concentration and antitrust laws generally portends a substantial impetus for
future OECD action in the field. A number of member countries are adopting
a more critical attitude toward the concentration phenomenon, and are mov-
ing in the direction of more stringent antitrust policy in general. At the same
time, no member country has currently evinced a trend in the direction of
fostering concentration. A number of member countries are seriously con-
templating enactment of merger controls or have recently introduced such
control. The most spectacular example is France, which for many years
encouraged corporate concentration. Similar controls are being considered in
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Sweden, Finland, and Ireland. Another group of countries, including Swit-
zerland and Germany, is taking action to strengthen its antitrust laws in
general.
These national trends will surely be reflected by the delegates in the
Committee of Experts, and the Committee of Experts will very likely adopt a
more critical attitude toward transnational corporation concentration. Of
course, the Organisation's unanimity principle theoretically will preclude for-
mal action if one member country opposes such action. Nonetheless, experi-
ence shows that if there is a clear majority on a particular issue, absolute
opposition is difficult to maintain over time. Compromise solutions are usu-
ally found. Even when this is not possible, it is still more likely that an
opposing party will abstain rather than veto a recommendation or suggestion
for action." The evolution of competition policies in the member countries
promises to keep the problem of transnational corporate concentration on the
OECD agenda, and increases the possibility that the OECD will adopt a more
vocal and critical position toward such concentration.
In addition to the influences of the member countries, the developments
in the European Economic Community and the United Nations will tend to
influence future OECD efforts in the area. The European Community, with a
functioning antitrust law and enforcement practice, stands as an example of
a working supranational antitrust regime, and should lend encouragement to
OECD member countries in developing greater cooperation on substantive
antitrust matters including mergers and concentration. Although the Euro-
pean communities do not yet have a functioning merger control procedure,
6
8
except in the coal and steel sectors, 69 a draft European Community merger
regulation has been under discussion for several years. Even though there is
little chance for effective action in the near future, enactment of a European
Community merger law would have a substantial impact on OECD initiatives
and would generate additional momentum for future OECD efforts.
The influence of United Nations activities on OECD efforts is somewhat
different. The United Nations, unlike the European Community, is a most
heterogenous organization, and consequently the likelihood of substantive
agreement on economic and competition values and objectives is minimal in
that forum. Nonetheless, UNCTAD and the UN Centre for Transnational
Corporations are considering the establishment of machinery which will be
relevant to the issue of transnational corporate concentration. Although there
is a marked disparity between the concerns of the industrialized and the
developing countries, any consensus which is achieved in the United Na-
tions organizations will undoubtedly encourage further OECD efforts. For
example, if UNCTAD were to establish a permanent committee of experts on
restrictive business practices, some method to harmonize the position of the
industrialized market economy countries will be required. The OECD would
be best equipped to effectuate that objective.
In summary, OECD efforts in transnational corporate concentration will
continue. As member countries begin informally to adopt similar attitudes
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toward the problem, the chances increase for formal OECD action. The
potential positive impetus of European Community merger control activities,
and the possible necessity of reaching a coordinated OECD position in the
realm of United Nations activities both would encourage the OECD to begin
a more activist role in the area of transnational corporate concentration.
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ANNEX I: RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING ACTION
AGAINST INFLATION IN THE FIELD OF COMPETITION POLICY
(Adopted by the Council at its 276th Meeting on 14th and 15th December
1971, and derestricted at its 280th Meeting on 26th January, 1972)
The Council,
Having regard to Article 5(b) of the Convention on the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Develoment of 14th December 1960;
Having regard to the Resolution of the Council of 5th December 1961
concerning Action in the Field of Restrictive Business Practices and the
Establishment of a Committee of Experts [Doc. No. OECD/C(61)47(Final)];
Having regard to the Report of 18th November 1971 on the Present
Problem of Inflation and, in particular, the proposals (16) and (19) contained
therein [Doc. No. C(70)182];
Having regard to the Interim Report of 26th March 1971 submitted by
the Chairman of the Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices
on Competition Policy and Inflation [Doc. No. C(71)491;
Recognising that an effective competition policy is one important factor
in the achievement of optimum economic growth and price stability; and that
measures to increase competition exercise a pressure on costs, prices and
profits and thus contribute to the fight agains inflation, although the impact
of competition policy is usually apparent in the long term and is less immedi-
ate than anti-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies;
Recognising the urgency of curbing inflation and the need for a coordi-
nated and global approach by all Member countries in order to bring about a
significant reduction in inflationary pressures in the near future;
Considering therefore that more emphasis should be given to competi-
tion policy at the national level and that, from this standpoint, legislation
against restrictive business practices should be applied with great vigilance
in Member countries and that additional measures could be introduced
where necessary;
Considering moreover that consumer policy can contribute to more ra-
tional consumer behaviour, which is essential for the effective functioning of
price and quality competition;
I. RECOMMENDS to the Governments of Member countries
1. that they should promptly take steps, within the framework of their exist-
ing legislation:
(i) to apply their restrictive business practices legislation with great vigi-
lance against the detrimental effects especially
(a) of price-fixing and market-sharing agreements,
(b) of monopolistic and oliogopolistic practices affecting prices, and
(c) of restrictive business practices in the field of patents and patient
licensing;
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(ii) to keep under review the price situation in key sectors of their economies
which have a monopolistic or oliogopolistic structure in order to reduce
any excessive prices by administrative or legal means at their disposal;
(iii) to examine whether the bodies responsible for the enforcement of the
restrictive business practices legislation have adequate means at their
disposal to carry out the measures outlined in paragraphs (i) and (ii)
above;
(iv) to strengthen their consumer policies in relation to consumer protection,
education and information, where they assist competition to function
more effectively;
2. that they should examine the advisability of adopting the following longer-
term measures, which may require new legislation:
(i) stronger action-by means of prohibition or control-against resale price
maintenance, recommended prices when they operate with a similar
effect to resale price maintenance, and refusal to sell employed in con-
nection with resale price maintenance or with recommended prices;
(ii) effective provisions against the harmful practices of monopolies and
oliogopolies;
(iii) effective provisions against undesirable mergers and concentrations of
enterprises which limit competition unduly;
(iv) extension of their legislation to cover restrictive business practices in
service industries or in those sectors to which it does not apply or does
not fully apply, when these exemptions are insufficiently justified having
regard to the public interest.
II. INSTRUCTS the Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices
to review, at its session in the autumn of 1972, the progress made, in particu-
lar with regard to short-term action in this field, and to report to the Council.
In adopting this Recommendation, the Council:
1. NOTED the Report by the Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business
Practices of 19th November 1971 on Action against Inflation in the Field of
Competition Policy [Doc. No. C(71)205 and Corrigendum] and the statement
made in this connection by the Delegate for Switzerland at the meeting of
the Executive Committee held from 8th to 10th December 1971 [Cf. CE/
M(71)39 Part III (Final), Item 278];
2. NOTED with satisfaction the efforts of the Committee of Experts on
Restrictive Business Practices to further develop international co-operation
for the purpose of increasing competition.
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ANNEX 2: EXCERPT FROM MERGERS AND COMPETITION POLICY:
REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON
RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (OECD, PARIS, 1979)
General Conclusions
158. The effects upon competition of international mergers are analytically
similar to those of domestic mergers, although they sometimes present spe-
cial problems of evaluation at the national level. On the one hand, unlike
purely domestic horizontal mergers, international mergers in some circum-
stances to not have any adverse effect on concentration at the national level,
and they can be a means of introducing vigorous new competition, particu-
larly where the company acquired is a small "foothold" company. It is also
possible, of course, that the merger may not improve a non-competitive situa-
tion, and may even worsen it if the acquired firm has a large market share.
The financial and other resources of the acquiring company can then be
used to exploit and increase the already large market share of the acquired
company. In addition, a merger which has no effect upon concentration in
the countries directly involved may nevertheless increase it at the world level
or in third countries. Moreover, an international merger may in some cases
lead to restrictions on the freedom of the acquired company to compete in
certain product lines or export markets. Also, national control over interna-
tional mergers sometimes presents jurisdictional and informational problems
not encountered in purely domestic mergers. Finally, there is the point that
excess profits resulting from international mergers are different to an impor-
tant degree from excess profits resulting from national mergers, in that the
latter involve a domestic redistribution of income whereas the former involve
a transfer of income between countries.
159. These considerations seem to point to the conclusion that, at the pres-
ent time, viewed from the standpoint of their competitive effects, interna-
tional mergers should, like national mergers, be treated on their respective
merits, that is whether they are likely to increase competition in production,
distribution and research and therefore the competitiveness of a country's
economy or whether, on the other hand, they may create undue concentra-
tions of economic power or otherwise injure competition. This judgement
can only be made on a case-by-case basis.
160. There are sufficient indications in some Member countries of a con-
tinuing trend towards increase aggregate concentration to suggest the need
for the adoption or strengthening of control of both national and interna-
tional mergers. Possible conflicts between Member countries in the field of
international mergers arising out of divergent national merger policies could
be reduced if Member countries work toward similar standards and ap-
proaches for assessing and dealing with mergers. Moreover, another problem
not exclusive to international mergers but requiring an international solution
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is the extra-territorial application or effect of competition policies. Although
the cases mentioned in this report do not lend support to the view that there
are frequent conflicts between Member countries in the field of international
mergers, in the event that such extra-territorial application or effect possibly
creates difficulties, a solution might be achieved under the 1967 OECD
Council Recommendation concerning cooperation between Member coun-
tries on restrictive business practices affecting international trade [C(67)-
53(Final)] or under the 1973 OECD Council Recommendation concerning a
consultation and conciliation procedure on restrictive business practices af-
fecting international trade [C(73)(Final)] or perhaps through creation of
some sort of new international anti-trust co-ordination arrangement.
International Mergers
182. The data presented in the chapter on international mergers show, for
those countries with records, that these may be a major component of all
merger activity and therefore they cannot be ignored on the ground of infre-
quent occurence. International mergers are a form of direct inward invest-
ment, and as such raise basically similar problems of efficiency and competi-
tion as do domestic mergers. There is evidence to suggest that this type of
merger may result from the desire to exploit some differential advantage,
whether it be efficiency or product differentiation; and as a consequence
their predominant form is horizontal rather than vertical or diversified. This
may not, of course, raise concentration levels in host countries but it does so
when the world market for the product is considered, and this may have
long-term detrimental consequences. In the short-term, on the other hand, it
is suggested that international mergers based on differential efficiency may
result in increased competition in host country markets because the foreign
entrant would wish to exploit this advantage; and will also not have absorbed
any prevailing non-competitive behaviour patterns. For these reasons it is not
possible to reach any general conclusions about the effect of international
mergers; like many domestic mergers they need to be considered as individ-
ual cases.
183. In those countries with merger control systems international mergers
have only been rarely considered. Canada and Japan have so far not taken
action against mergers between foreign entrants and their own national
firms, while in the United Kingdom only one such case was considered and
this was found unlikely to operate against the public interest. A few cases
have occurred in the United States of America and these have been judged
in terms of their effects on competition, the predominant consideration being
foreclosure of markets and restraint of expansion of actual or potential com-
petitors in concentrated industries. A similar consideration arose with Conti-
nental Can case in the European Economic Community. In view of this
relative lack of experience it can be tentatively suggested that few interna-
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tional mergers have yet raised problems of enhanced market power, but
where they have they have been judged strictly in accordance with competi-
tion policy considerations.
184. Although there have only been a relatively small number of interna-
tional mergers which have appeared to raise questions for competition policy
so far, it is likely that the continual growth in international investment and
the integration of world markets will lead to many more such cases in the
future. The evidence does not suggest that jurisdictional and other problems
have yet arisen, but as this may well change in the future with an increased
number of international mergers there are good grounds for suggesting that
it would be valuable for there to be an international exchange of information
and, where necessary, consultations about such mergers.
Suggestions for Future Action by Member Countries
185. The accelerating trend towards merger together with the already high
level of concentration in a number of economic sectors draws attention to the
problems of competition which are created by changing market structures
and it seems therefore appropriate at the present time to suggest to Member
countries which have not yet done so to consider the adoption of an effective
system of merger control.
186. The following characteristics might be taken into account:
i) a procedure for registering mergers, wherever this is felt necessary;
ii) a system to facilitate obtaining information about occurence of major
mergers, such as requiring their prior notification;
iii) minimum quantitative criteria below which mergers would not be subject
to control;
iv) objective criteria or presumptions for use in evaluating mergers;
v) reasonable time limits for deciding initially whether to allow or challenge
certain mergers.
187. With respect to the application of national laws to mergers and acquisi-
tions involving foreign enterprises and any conflicts which may arise from
such an application, Member countries are invited to have recourse to the
OECD Council Recommendation of 1967 concerning cooperation between
Member countries in the field of restictive business practices affecting inter-
national trade and to the OECD Council Recommendation of 1973 concern-
ing a consultation and conciliation procedure on restrictive business prac-
tices affecting international trade.
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ANNEX 3: DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (21ST JUNE 1976)
The governments of OECD member countries, considering
that international investment has assumed increased importance in the
world economy and has considerably contributed to the development of
their countries;
that multinational enterprises play an important role in this investment
process;
that co-operation by Member countries can improve the foreign invest-
ment climate, encourage the positive contribution which multinational
enterprises can make to economic and social progress, and minimise and
resolve difficulties which may arise from their various operations;
that, while continuing endeavours within the OECD may lead to further
international arrangements and agreements in this field, it seems appro-
priate at this stage to intensify their co-operation and consultation on
issues relating to international investment and multinational enterprises
through inter-related instruments each of which deals with a different
aspect of the matter and together constitute a framework within which
the OECD will consider these issues:
Declare:
I. Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
that they jointly recommend to multinational enterprises operating in their
territories the observance of the Guidelines as set forth in the Annex hereto
having regard to the considerations and understandings which introduce the
Guidelines and are an integral part of them;
II. National Treatment
1. that Member countries should, consistent with their needs to maintain
public order, to protect their essential security interests and to fulfil com-
mitments relating to international peace and security, accord to entre-
prises operating in their territories and owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by nationals of another Member country (hereinafter referred to
as "Foreign-Controlled Enterprises") treatment under their laws, regula-
tions and administrative practices, consistent with international law and
no less favourable than that accorded in like situations to domestic enter-
prises (hereinafter referred to as "National Treatment");
2. that Member countries will consider applying "National Treatment" in
respect of countries other than Member countries;
3. That Member countries will endeavour to ensure that their territorial sub-
divisions apply "National Treatment";
Note: The Turkish Government did not participate in the Declaration and abstained
from the Decisions.
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4. That this Declaration does not deal with the right of Member countries to
regulate the entry of foreign investment or the conditions of establishment
of foreign enterprises;
III. International Investment Incentives and Disincentives
1. That they recognise the need to strengthen their co-operation in the field
of international direct investment;
2. That they thus recognise the need to give due weight to the interests of
Member countries affected by specific laws, regulations and administra-
tive practices in this field (hereinafter called "measures") providing official
incentives and disincentives to international direct investment;
3. That Member countries will endeavour to make such measures as transpar-
ent as possible, so that their importance and purpose can be ascertained
and that information on them can be readily available;
IV. Consultation Procedures
that they are prepared to consult one another on the above matters in conform-
ity with the Decisions of the Council relating to Inter-Governmental Consulta-
tion Procedures on the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, on National
Treatment and on International Investment Incentives and Disincentives;
V. Review
that they will review the above matters within three years with a view to
improving the effectiveness of international economic cooperation among
Member countries on issues relating to international investment and multi-
national enterprises;
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Annex to the Declaration of 21st
June 1976 by Governments of OECD Member Countries on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises
1. Multinational enterprises now play an important part in the economies of
Member countries and in international economic relations, which is of
increasing interest to governments. Through international direct invest-
ment, such enterprises can bring substantial benefits to home and host
countries by contributing to the efficient utilisation of capital, technology
and human resources between countries and can thus fulfil an important
role in the promotion of economic and social welfare. But the advances
made by multinational enterprises in organising their operations beyond
the national framework may lead to abuse of concentrations of economic
power and to conflicts with national policy objectives. In addition, the
complexity of these multinational enterprises and the difficulty of clearly
perceiving their diverse structures, operations and policies sometimes
give rise to concern.
2. The common aim of the Member countries is to encourage the positive
contributions which multinational enterprises can make to economic and
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social progress and to minimise and resolve the difficulties to which their
various operations may give rise. In view of the transnational structure of
such enterprises, this aim will be furthered by co-operation among the
OECD countries where the headquarters of most of the multinational
enterprises are established and which are the location of a substantial
part of their operations. The guidelines set out hereafter are designed to
assist in the achievement of this common aim and to contribute to im-
proving the foreign investment climate.
3. Since the operations of multinational enterprises extend throughout the
world, including countries that are not Members of the Organisation,
international co-operation in this field should extend to all States. Mem-
ber countries will give their full support to efforts undertaken in co-
operation with non-member countries, and in particular with developing
countries, with a view to improving the welfare and living standards of all
people both by encouraging the positive contributions which multina-
tional enterprises can make and by minimising and resolving the prob-
lems which may arise in connection with their activities.
4. Within the Organisation, the programme of co-operation to attain these
ends will be a continuing, pragmatic and balanced one. It comes within
the general aims of the Convention on the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and makes full use of the vari-
ous specialised bodies of the Organisation, whose terms of reference
already cover many aspects of the role of multinational enterprises,
notably in matters of international trade and payments, competition,
taxation, manpower, industrial development, science and technology. In
these bodies, work is being carried out on the identification of issues,
the improvement of relevant qualitative and statistical information and
the elaboration of proposals for action designed to strengthen inter-
governmental co-operation. In some of these areas procedures already
exist through which issues related to the operations of multinational
enterprises can be taken up. This work could result in the conclusions
of further and complementary agreements and arrangements between
governments.
5. The initial phase of the co-operation programme is composed of a Decla-
ration and three Decisions promulgated simultaneously as they are com-
plementary and inter-connected, in respect of guidelines for multina-
tional enterprises, national treatment for foreign-controlled enterprises
and international investment incentives and disincentives.
6. The guidelines set out below are recommendations jointly addressed by
Member countries to multinational enterprises operating in their territo-
ries. These guidelines, which take into account the problems which can
arise because of the international structure of these enterprises, lay down
standards for the activities of these enterprises in the different Member
countries. Observance of the guidelines is voluntary and not legally en-
forceable. However, they should help to ensure that the operations of
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these enterprises are in harmony with national policies of the countries
where they operate and to strengthen the basis of mutual confidence
between enterprises and States.
7. Every State has the right to prescribe the conditions under whch multi-
national enterprises operate within its national jurisdiction, subject to
international law and to the international agreements to which it has
subscribed. The entities of a multinational enterprise located in various
countries are subject to the laws of these countries.
8. A precise legal definition of multinational enterprises is not required for
the purposes of the guidelines. These usually comprise companies or
other entities whose ownership is private, state or mixed, established in
different countries and so linked that one or more of them may be able to
exercise a significant influence over the activities of others and, in par-
ticular, to share knowledge and resources with the others. The degree of
autonomy of each entity in relation to the others varies widely from one
multinational enterprise to another, depending on the nature of the links
between such entities and the fields of activity concerned. For these
reasons, the guidelines are addressed to the various entities within the
multinational enterprise (parent companies and/or local entities) accord-
ing to the actual distribution of responsibilities among them on the un-
derstanding that they will cooperate and provide assistance to one an-
other as necessary to facilitate observance of the guidelines. The word
"enterprise" as used in these guidelines refers to these various entities in
accordance with their responsibilities.
9. The guidelines are not aimed at introducing differences of treatment
between multinational and domestic enterprises; wherever relevant they
reflect good practice for all. Accordingly, multinational and domestic en-
terprises are subject to the same expectations in respect of their conduct
wherever the guidelines are relevant to both.
10. The use of appropriate international dispute settlement mechanisms,
including arbitration, should be encouraged as a means of facilitating
the resolution of problems arising between enterprises and Member
countries.
11. Member countries have agreed to establish appropriate review and con-
sultation procedures concerning issues arising in respect of the guide-
lines. When multinational enterprises are made subject to conflicting
requirements by Member countries, the governments concerned will co-
operate in good faith with a view to resolving such problems either
within the Committee on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises established by OECD Council on 21st January 1975 or
through other mutually acceptable arrangements.
Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the Member countries set
forth the following guidelines for multinational enterprises with the un-
derstanding that Member countries will fulfil their responsibilities to
treat enterprises equitably and in accordance with international law and
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1. take fully into account established general policy objectives of the Mem-
ber countries in which they operate;
2. in particular, give due consideration to those countries' aims and priori-
ties with regard to economic and social progress, including industrial
and regional development, the protection of the environment, the cre-
ation of employment opportunities, the promotion of innovation and the
transfer of technology;
3. while observing their legal obligations concerning information, supply
their entities with supplementary information the latter may need in
order to meet requests by the authorities of the countries in which those
entities are located for information relevant to the activities of those
entities, taking into account legitimate requirements of business confi-
dentiality;
4. favour close co-operation with the local community and business
interests;
5. allow their component entities freedom to develop their activities and to
exploit their competitive advantage in domestic and foreign markets, con-
sistent with the need for specialisation and sound commercial practice;
6. when filling responsible posts in each country of operation, take due
account of individual qualifications without discrimination as to nation-
ality, subject to particular national requirements in this respect;
7. not render-and they should not be solicited or expected to render-any
bribe or other improper benefit, direct or indirect, to any public servant
or holder of public office;
8. unless legally permissible, not make contributions to candidates for pub-
lic office or to political parties or other political organisations;
9. abstain from any improper involvement in local political activities.
Disclosure of information
Enterprises should, having due regard to their nature and relative size in the
economic context of their operations and to requirements of business confi-
dentiality and to cost, publish in a form suited to improve public understand-
ing a sufficient body of factual information on the structure, activities and
policies of the enterprise as a whole, as a supplement, in so far as necessary
for this purpose, to information to be disclosed under the national law of the
individual countries in which they operate. To this end, they should publish
within reasonable time limits, on a regular basis, but at least annually, finan-
cial statements and other pertinent information relating to the enterprise as a
whole, comprising in particular:
Recent OECD Activities - 251
i. the structure of the enterprise, showing the name and location of the
parent company, its main affiliates, its percentage ownership, direct
and indirect, in these affiliates, including shareholdings between
them;
ii. the geographical areas* where operations are carried out and the prin-
cipal activities carried on therein by the parent company and the main
affiliates;
iii. the operating results and sales by geographical area and the sales in
the major lines of business for the enterprise as a whole;
iv. significant new capital investment by geographical area and, as far as
practicable, by major lines of business for the enterprise as a whole;
v. a statement of the sources and uses of funds by the enterprise as a
whole;
vi. the average number of employees in each geographical area;
vii. research and development expenditure for the enterprise as a whole;
viii. the policies followed in respect of intra-group pricing;
ix. the accounting policies, including those on consolidation, observed in
compiling the published information.
Competition
Enterprises should, while conforming to official competition rules and estab-
lished policies of the countries in which they operate,
1. refrain from actions which would adversely affect competition in the
relevant market by abusing a dominant position of market power, by
means of, for example,
a. anti-competitive acquisitions,
b. predatory behaviour toward competitors,
c. unreasonable refusal to deal,
d. anti-competitive abuse of industrial property rights,
e. discriminatory (i.e. unreasonably differentiated) pricing and using
such pricing transactions between affiliated enterprises as a means
of affecting adversely competition outside these enterprises;
2. allow purchasers, distributors and licensees freedom to resell, export,
purchase and develop their operations consistent with law, trade condi-
tions, the need for specialisation and sound commercial practice;
3. refrain from participating in or otherwise purposely strengthening the
restrictive effects of international or domestic cartels or restrictive agree-
For the purposes of the guideline on disclosure of information the term "geographical
area" means groups of countries or individual countries as each enterprise determines
is appropriate in its particular circumstances. While no single method of grouping is
appropriate for all enterprises or for all purposes, the factors to be considered by an
enterprise would include the significance of operations carried out in individual coun-
tries or areas as well as the effects on its competitiveness, geographic proximity,
economic affinity, similarities in business environments and the nature, scale and
degree of interrelationship of the enterprises' operations in the various countries.
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ments which adversely affect or eliminate competition and which are
not generally or specifically accepted under applicable national or inter-
national legislation;
4. be ready to consult and co-operate, including the provision of informa-
tion, with competent authorities of countries whose interests are directly
affected in regard to competition issues or investigations. Provision of
information should be in accordance with safeguards normally applica-
ble in this field.
Financing
Enterprises should, in managing the financial and commercial operations of
their activities, and especially their liquid foreign assets and liabilities, take
into consideration the established objectives of the countries in which they
operate regarding balance of payments and credit policies.
Taxation
Enterprises should
1. upon request of the taxation authorities of the countries in which they
operate, provide, in accordance with the safeguards and relevant proce-
dures of the national laws of these countries, the information necessary
to determine correctly the taxes to be assessed in connection with their
operations, including relevant information concerning their operations
in other countries;
2. refrain from making use of the particular facilities available to them,
such as transfer pricing which does not conform to an arm's length
standard, for modifying in ways contrary to national laws the tax base on
which members of the group are assessed.
Employment and industrial relations
Enterprises should, within the framework of law, regulations and prevailing
labour relations and employment practices, in each of the countries in which
they operate,
1. respect the right of their employees, to be represented by trade unions
and other bona fide organisations of employees, and engage in construc-
tive negotiations, either individually or through employers' associations,
with such employee organisations with a view to reaching agreements
on employment conditions, which should include provisions for dealing
with disputes arising over the interpretation of such agreements, and for
ensuring mutually respected rights and responsibilities;
2. a. provide such facilities to representatives of the employees as may
be necessary to assist in the development of effective collective
agreements,
b. provide to representatives of employees information which is needed
for meaningful negotiations on conditions of employment;
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3. provide to representatives of employees where this accords with local
law and practice, information which enables them to obtain a true and
fair view of the performance of the entity or, where appropriate, the
enterprise as a whole;
4. observe standards of employment and industrial relations not less fa-
vourable than those observed by comparable employers in the host
country;
5. in their operations, to the greatest extent practicable, utilise, train and
prepare for upgrading members of the local labour force in co-operation
with representatives of their employees and, where appropriate, the rele-
vant governmental authorities;
6. in considering changes in their operations which would have major
effects upon the livelihood of their employees, in particular in the case
of the closure of an entity involving collective lay-offs or dismissals,
provide reasonable notice of such changes to representatives of their
employees, and where appropriate to the relevant governmental authori-
ties, and co-operate with the employee representatives and appropriate
governmental authorities so as to mitigate to the maximum extent prac-
ticable adverse effects;
7. implement their employment policies including hiring, discharge, pay,
promotion and training without discrimination unless selectivity in re-
spect of employee characteristics is in furtherance of established gov-
ernmental policies which specifically promote greater equality of em-
ployment opportunity;
8. in the context of bona fide negotiations* with representatives of employ-
ees on conditions of employment, or while employees are exercising a
right to organise, not threaten to utilise a capacity to transfer the whole
or part of an operating unit from the country concerned in order to
influence unfairly those negotiations or to hinder the exercise of a right
to organise;
9. enable authorised representatives of their employees to conduct negotia-
tions on collective bargaining or labour management relations issues
with representatives of management who are authorised to take deci-
sions on the matters under negotiation.
Science and technology
Enterprises should
1. endeavour to ensure that their activities fit satisfactorily into the scien-
tific and technological policies and plans of the countries in which they
operate, and contribute to the development of national scientific and
technological capacities, including as far as appropriate the establish-
ment and improvement in host countries of their capacity to innovate;
*Bona fide negotiations may include labour disputes as part of the process of negotia-
tion. Whether or not labour disputes are so included will be determined by the law and
prevailing employment practices of particular countries.
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2. to the fullest extent practicable, adopt in the course of their business
activities practices which permit the rapid diffusion of technologies with
due regard to the protection of industrial and intellectual property
rights;
3. when granting licences for the use of industrial property rights or
when otherwise transferring technology do so on reasonable terms
and conditions.
Decision of the Council on Inter-governmental Consultation Procedures on
the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
The Council,
Having regard to the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development of 14th December, 1960 and, in particular, to
Articles 2(d), 3 and 5(a) thereof;
Having regard to the Resolution of the Council of 21st January, 1975
establishing a Committee on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises and, in particular, to paragraph 2 thereof [C(74)247(Final)];
Taking note of the Declaration by the Governments of OECD Member
countries of 21st June, 1976 in which they jointly recommend to multina-
tional enterprises the observance of guidelines for multinational enterprises;
Recognising the desirability of setting forth procedures by which consul-
tations may take place on matters related to these guidelines;
On the proposal of the Committee on International Investment and Mul-
tinational Enterprises;
Decides:
1. The Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enter-
prises (hereinafter called "the Committee") shall periodically or at the
request of a Member country hold an exchange of views on matters re-
lated to the guidelines and the experience gained in their application. The
Committee shall periodically report to the Council on these matters.
2. The Committee shall periodically invite the Business and Industry Advisory
Committee to OECD (BIAC) and the Trade Union Advisory Committee to
OECD (TUAC) to express their views on matters related to the guidelines
and shall take account of such views in its reports to the Council.
3. On the proposal of a Member country the Committee may decide whether
individual enterprises should be given the opportunity, if they so wish, to
express their views concerning the application of the guidelines. The Com-
mittee shall not reach conclusions on the conduct of individual enterprises.
4. Member countries may request that consultations be held in the Commit-
tee on any problem arising from the fact that multinational enterprises
are made subject to conflicting requirements. Governments concerned
will co-operate in good faith with a view to resolving such problems,
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either within the Committee or through other mutually acceptable
arrangements.
5. This Decision shall be reviewed within a period of three years. The Com-
mittee shall make proposals for this purpose as appropriate.
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ANNEX 4: EXCERPT FROM RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES OF
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (OECD, PARIS, 1977)
II. Possible remedies
195. The following possible remedies are discussed from two points of view:
whether they are capable of solving or mitigating the problems identified in
this report and whether they are useful and likely to be accepted by Member
countries in the not too distant future. No attempt is made to suggest one
measure to solve all problems, but rather a set of possible remedies is proposed
which, taken together, may lead in this direction. A wide range of proposals is
included, envisaging, among other things, the creation of new procedures to
obtain more information about multinational enterprises at national and inter-
national levels, the development of international consultation, conciliation and
arbitration procedures, or of voluntary codes of good conduct, standards of
behaviour or guidelines for enterprises and governments, and even the cre-
ation of a binding international antitrust law and an international agency with
powers of enforcement. In discussing such possible remedies, a distinction is
made between possible action by the business community itself and possible
remedies at national and at international levels.
1. By the business community
.196. Action by the business community itself would be a first step, and
would be of a voluntary nature. It would consist of avoiding conduct clearly
at variance with competition guidelines20 0 particularly in situations where
affected countries may not apply their laws and policies effectively due to the
international character of the enterprise or practices in question. Co-
operation in furnishing information beyond legal obligations seems already to
be taking place in some Member countries. It should be further encouraged,
in particular with regard to relevant information located outside the national
territory and in the possession of corporate entities other than the one doing
business on national territory. To a certain extent, voluntary co-operation
seems also to be possible in relation to the service of documents. Enterprises
could occasionally waive any rights they might have as to methods or place of
service in the interests of a speedy procedure and resolution of legal issues.
2. At the national level
197. Probably the most effective measures to solve or mitigate the problems
identified in this report would consist of national legislative action. At the
present time, there are no institutions in the world with powers comparable
to those of governments. The experience of countries with more sophisti-
cated competition laws and policies shows that the introduction or strength-
ening of antitrust laws and competition policies could substantially contri-
bute to solving not only a significant number of the problems connected with
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the activities of multinational enterprises but also those of national enter-
prises. As only governments have the power to take such legislative mea-
sures, they also have the responsibility for considering such action in the first
instance.
198. Legislative action could solve a substantial number of the problems of
national and international economic concentration in relevant markets in
which multinational enterprises play a significant role. This could be done by
introducing or strengthening, if one already exists, a system of merger con-
trol utilising an analysis of the competitive effects of mergers, whether in-
volving multinational or domestic enterprises, with, if deemed necessary,
appropriate powers of divestiture or dissolution according to the needs of the
countries concerned.
199. Legislative action by Member countries could also include the introduc-
tion or, if one already exists, the strengthening of a system of abuse control
over economically powerful or market dominating enterprises, among which
most multinational enterprises are to be found. Experience in those Member
countries which already have a workable system of abuse control shows that
many substantive problems relating to powerful enterprises, not necessarily
excluding those which may be created by arrangements among affiliated
enterprises, can be alleviated under such a system.
200. It does not appear that restrictive agreement legislation is directed at
purely intra-corporate conduct for the reasons discussed below. Competition
laws and policies in the OECD Member nations generally provide that intra-
enterprise practices such as allocation of functions among branches or sub-
sidiaries of a single enterprise are not considered in themselves as an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade. Holding such practices unlawful would be likely to
discourage internal growth and decrease efficiency. It might also force upon
competition authorities the impracticable task of seeking to create and main-
tain competition within a single enterprise on an ongoing basis. In no case
have arrangements within the same legal entity, such as between branches
or operating divisions of the same company, been held to be unlawful. Even
in cases involving separate legal entities under common control, findings of
illegality have been rare and have been based upon exhaustive factual analy-
sis of the particular cases. In certain instances of arrangements between
legally separate entities with partial common ownership which eliminated
significant pre-exisiting or potential competition among the entities or which
injured competition outside the enterprise by means for instance, of agreed
refusals to deal, illegality has been found.
201. A third field in which legislative action by governments could help to
resolve problems is that of industrial, commercial and intellectual property
rights. Legislation or regulatory action might follow the lines suggested in
the OECD Recommendation concerning action against restrictive business
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practices relating to the use of patents and licences of 22nd January, 1974
referred to in paragraph 100 above (see Annex III).
202. Governmental action introducing or strengthening merger control sys-
tems, control over abuses by economically powerful enterprises and compe-
tition rules prohibiting the abuse of industrial, commercial and intellectual
property rights are not the only measures capable of diminishing the prob-
lems identified in this report although they would certainly be among those
which might be expected to have the most far-reaching results. Taking into
account the great diversity of laws and policies existing in Member coun-
tries it seems to be impossible to draw up a complete list of possibilities for
legislative action. In those Member countries, however, which do not yet
have legislation prohibiting horizontal and vertical restrictive agreements or
a workable abuse control system regulating them, serious consideration
might be given to introducing such legislation. A number of Member coun-
tries have found it effective to apply their legislation to restrictive conduct
which has a substantial, direct and foreseeable effect on the country apply-
ing its law.
203. A further possibility for action by governments relates more specifically
to antitrust procedure. One of the central problems identified in this report is
that of collecting relevant information controlled by a mulitnational enter-
prise which is located outside the national territory, for purposes of an inves-
tigation of conduct affecting the jurisdiction. One of the elements contribut-
ing to this problem is the very nature of the multinational enterprise with
units in various countries. Additional problems may be created by the reluc-
tance of enterprises to co-operate in providing such information. It therefore
seems appropriate that countries should consider, in conformity with the
established rules of international law and taking into account international
comity, the development of national procedures with a view to enhancing
their ability to obtain relevant information which is outside of their territory
but which is within the control of the multinational enterprise concerned and
which is necessary to the enforcement of national antitrust laws and the
disclosure of which is not contrary to the law of the place where the informa-
tion is located. For example, in certain circumstances, it might be appropri-
ate to interpret non-compliance to the disadvantage of the enterprise which
cannot justify such non-compliance. An appropriate legal test for demanding
such information may be whether the parent or subsidiary outside the juris-
diction and its affiliate in the jurisdiction both participated actively in the
transaction being investigated, or whether the foreign parent actively super-
vised a local affiliate which did participate.
204. Another problem is the existence in some states of legislation or policies
which preclude an enterprise from providing business-related information to
foreign governments. A possibility for action by governments to solve this
problem would be, perhaps in the context of bilateral or multilateral under-
standings, appropriate modification of national laws preventing disclosure of
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relevant information by or concerning multinational enterprises so as to allow
disclosure to competition authorities of other jurisdictions under proper
procedures and safeguards. However, where these laws are of general appli-
cation, such modification may raise problems which go beyond issues of
competition policy.
3. At international level
205. At the international level, action may mainly be taken by governments
and by international organisations. As to the action of governments at the
international level, the least complicated possibility seems to be that of bilat-
eral arrangements, agreements or formal treaties. They could cover a wide
variety of subjects, ranging from the exchange of generally available informa-
tion to the creation of a common antitrust law. As to the first possibility, it
should be noted that OECD Member countries already have the opportunity
to utilise or develop other procedures dealing with the exchange of informa-
ton at the OECD level (cf. paragraph 206 below). However, Member coun-
tries might more readily exchange information which is not generally avail-
able on a bilateral basis with countries with similar antitrust and competition
philosophies. Bilateral agreements relating to the exchange of information,
consultation, conciliation or mutual administrative and judicial aid might
well be useful and could lead to further developments which would help to
overcome the problems identified in this report. Effectively functioning co-
operation may lead the participating countries towards further harmonization
of their antitrust laws and competition policies or co-ordination of investiga-
tions or procedures, a development which is also desirable from the viewpoint
of enterprises doing business in these countries, since it would provide more
certainty than currently exists. Also, third countries might, if co-operation
was effective between the parties to a bilateral treaty, either wish to join the
arrangement in order to mitigate their own problems in the field of antitrust
and competition policy, or decide to conclude similar agreements with other
countries closer to them in terms of their laws and policies.
206. On a more than bilateral and less than global level, a number of inter-
national organisations can and do help to reduce the problems identified in
this report. The OECD Recommendation of 5th October, 1967 concerning
co-operation between Member countries on restrictive business practices af-
fecting international trade (see Annex I) and the OECD Recommendation of
3rd July, 1973 concerning a consultation and conciliation procedure on re-
strictive business practices affecting international trade (see Annex II) are
procedures which, without discriminating between national and multina-
tional enterprises, may help to iron out some of the problems in question
here. The 1967 Recommendation established a voluntary procedure for prior
notification of antitrust investigations and proceedings by Member countries
when important interests of another Member country are involved. It also
provided for the co-ordination of antitrust enforcement, co-operation in devel-
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oping or applying mutually beneficial methods of dealing with restrictive
business practices in international trade and exchanges of information on
antitrust matters to the extent possible. Most of the notifications and requests
for information which have been made since 1968 related to multinational
enterprises. Certain of these notifications have approached being a form of
voluntary consultation procedure aimed at achieving mutually agreed adjust-
ments through discussions among the Member countries concerned. Such a
development is in line with the 1973 Council Recommendation, although
this Recommendation has never been specifically invoked in practice. Mem-
ber countries may consider making specific use of this Recommendation,
altering it or suggesting alternative proposals.
207. At the regional level, the European Communities have adopted a highly
sophisticated antitrust law which, once a system of merger control is intro-
duced, will be among the most comprehensive legislations in the world. It is
no more difficult for the Commission, which is the regional antitrust author-
ity having its own powers of enforcement, to enforce its legislation than it is
for a national authority to enforce national law; it may take action directly
within the territory of all Member States and not only in one of them. Al-
though in the European Communities national laws relating to competition
may apply simultaneously, implying that there may be parallel procedures,
the fact that there is a fairly comprehensive legislation and an effective
competition policy in the European Communities has allowed substantial
results to be achieved in regard to the restrictive practices of multinational
enterprises the scope of which extends beyond purely national territory.
208. At the OECD level, a common antitrust law comparable to that of the
European Communities is not realistically achievable. There are, however, a
number of ways other than the OECD Recommendations of 1967 and 1973 in
which OECD could help to reduce some of the problems identified above. The
Committee believes that the OECD voluntary guidelines contained in the
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises
adopted by the OECD Council, meeting at Ministerial level, on 21st June,
1976, relating to competition and the shaping of corporate conduct in a gen-
eral way (see Annex IV), should serve useful purposes. Of course, to some
extent guidelines dealing with difficult legal and economic concepts such as
abuse of a dominant position and adverse effects on competition cannot in
themselves provide precise rules for business executives to follow in specific
circumstances. Under the national law of various countries, these concepts
have been given meaning only through interpretation by the competent tribu-
nals. However, the Committee considered that such guidelines could nonethe-
less provide useful standards for enterprises and could be of value in helping to
achieve a common approach towards multinational enterprises as well as ac-
ceptable relationships between multinational enterprises and countries whose
trade they affect. In addition, they could contribute to the further development
of widely accepted standards within OECD and at world level.
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209. Even though certain courses of action may be suggested to Member
governments this does not mean that the OECD should cease to study multi-
national enterprises from various antitrust and competition policy viewpoints.
Although the development of an international antitrust law and the creation
of an international antitrust authority can only be a long-run possibility, this
issue is still being discussed at international level. As most parent companies
of multinational enterprises are located in OECD Member countries, among
which are to be found those with the most developed antitrust laws, it seems
appropriate for the OECD to keep in touch through its Committee of Experts
on Restrictive Business Practices with endeavours to establish international
antitrust principles and institutions. In addition, it seems appropriate for the
OECD to study, through the same Committee, other means of coping with
the problems identified in the report in connection with its other work and, at
the same time, to endeavour to identify the problems still more precisely in
order to achieve a better understanding of their importance and a better basis
for the consideration of possible remedies.
III. Suggestions for action
210. In accordance with the considerations set forth in paragraph 198, it is
suggested that Member countries which have not yet done so consider the
introduction of a workable system of merger control or the strengthening of
an already introduced but not effectively functioning merger control system.
As regards the criteria to be observed, it is sufficient to refer to the Commit-
tee's report on mergers, published by OECD in 1975, paragraphs 170 and
186 of which read as follows:
"185. The accelerating trend towards merger together with the already high
level of concentration in a number of economic sectors draws attention to the
problems of competition which are created by changing market structures
and it seems therefore appropriate at the present time to suggest to Member
countries which have not yet done so to consider the adoption of an effective
system of merger control.
186. The following characteristics might be taken into account:
i. a procedure for registering mergers, wherever this is felt necessary:
ii. a system to facilitate obtaining information about occurrence of ma-
jor mergers, such as requiring their prior notification;
iii. minimum quantitative criteria below which mergers would not be
subject to control;
iv. objective criteria or presumptions for use in evaluating mergers;
v. reasonable time limits for deciding initially whether to allow or chal-
lenge certain mergers."
211. In accordance with paragraph 199 above, it is suggested that Member
countries which have not yet done so consider the creation of a workable
abuse control procedure, the strengthening of an already existing abuse con-
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trol procedure for market dominating and economically powerful enterprises
or the creation or strengthening of legislation against monopolisation or at-
tempts to monopolise.
212. With reference to the matters considered in paragraph 200 above, the
Committee has no changes to recommend at this time in relation to the
treatment of intra-corporate arrangements.
213. In accordance with paragraph 201 above, it is suggested that Member
countries consider legislation or regulatory action against restrictive business
practices relating to the use of patents and licences.
214. In accordance with paragraph 203 above, it is suggested that Member
countries consider how they could develop appropriate procedures to facili-
tate investigation and discovery by their antitrust authorities in regard to
information located outside their national territory, in conformity with the
rules of public international law and taking into account international comity.
215. Also, in accordance with paragraphs 203 and 204 above, it is suggested
that Member countries might, where discretion exists, consider whether and,
if so, how and under what safeguards to provide or allow disclosure of infor-
mation relevant to the enforcement of national antitrust laws and to national
competition policy purposes but which at present may not be obtainable or
transmissible to other Member countries for legal reasons.
216. In accordance with paragraph 205 above, it is suggested that Member
countries consider the possibility of concluding bilateral or multilateral
treaties on mutual administrative and judicial aid with other Member coun-
tries which would be applicable to the enforcement of restrictive business
practices laws.
217. In view of the advisability of taking action in regard to the problems
identified in this report not only at national and bilateral levels, it is sug-
gested that Member countries make use as far as possible of the OECD
Recommendation of 1967 concerning co-operation between Member coun-
tries on restrictive business practices affecting international trade and con-
tinue to explore possible use of the Recommendation of 1973 concerning a
consultation and conciliation procedure on restrictive business practices af-
fecting international trade.
218. The OECD Committe of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices will
keep under review antitrust and competition policy problems identified in
this report and try, as part of its future programme of work, to study these
problems in greater depth in order to develop more adequate measures to
remedy them. The Committee will in particular keep in touch with all en-
deavours at the international level to deal with antitrust and competition
policy problems connected with multinational enterprises.
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ANNEX 5: RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING ACTION
AGAINST RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL
TRADE INCLUDING THOSE INVOLVING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
(Adopted by the Council at its 469th Meeting on 20th July, 1978)
[The Representative for Turkey abstained]
The Council,
Having regard to Article 5(b) of the Convention on the Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development of 14th December, 1960;
Having regard to the Declaration on International Investment and Multi-
national Enterprises adopted by the Governments of OECD Member coun-
tries on 21st June, 1976;
Having regard to the Report of the Committee of Experts on Restrictive
Business Practices of 10th February, 1977 on the restrictive business prac-
tices of multinational enterprises [RBP(77)1-MNE];
Considering that restrictive business practices may have harmful effects
on international trade whether they emanate from purely national or from
multinational enterprises;
Considering that the restrictive business practices of multinational en-
terprises do not differ in form from those operated by purely national enter-
prises but that they may have a more significant impact on trade and compe-
tition due to the fact that multinational enterprises generally tend to wield
greater market power, that they play a relatively greater role in the process of
national and international concentration and that the restrictive business
practices they engage in have more often an international character;
Recognising that, in the present state of international law and of the laws
on restrictive business practices of Member countries, control of practices
affecting international trade, including those involving multinational enter-
prises, raises many difficulties, especially in assembling necessary information
held outside the jurisdiction of the country applying its law, in serving process
and in enforcing decisions in relation to enterprises located abroad;
Recognising that the solution to these difficulties cannot at present be
found in an international convention establishing control of restrictive busi-
ness practices affecting international trade owing mainly to the still differing
attitudes adopted by countries toward restrictive business practices and in
particular to their varying national legislations in this field.
Considering, however, that the difficulties in controlling restrictive busi-
ness practices affecting international trade, including those involving multi-
national enterprises, may be allevitaed by simultaneous efforts in the fields of
national legislation on restrictive business practices and of international co-
operation particularly within the OECD framework, it being understood that
such co-operation should not in any way be construed to affect the legal
positions of Member countries, in particular with regard to such questions of
sovereignty and extraterritorial application of laws concerning restrictive
business practices as may arise;
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I. RECOMMENDS the Governments of Member countries to consider the
following action:
(1) to adopt new or supplement existing measures on restrictive business
practices so as to prohibit or control effectively such practices,
particularly:
(a) actions adversely affecting competition in the relevant market by
abusing a dominant position of market power by means of, for ex-
ample, anti-competitive acquisitions; predatory behaviour toward
competitors; unreasonable refusal to deal; anti-competitive abuse of
industrial property rights; discriminatory (i.e. unreasonably differen-
tiated) pricing and using such pricing transactions between affiliated
enterprises as a means of affecting adversely competition outside
these enterprises;
(b) cartels or other restrictive agreements which without justification
adversely affect or eliminate competition;
(2) to develop, consistent with established rules of international law and
taking international comity into account appropriate national rules to
facilitate investigation and discovery by their respective competition au-
thorities of relevant information within the control of an enterprise under
investigation, where such information is located outside their respective
national territories and when its provision is not contrary to the law or
established policies of the country where the information is located;
(3) to allow, subject to appropriate safeguards, including those relating to
confidentiality, the disclosure of information to the competent authorities
of Member countries by the other parties concerned, whether accom-
plished unilaterally or in the context of bilateral or multilateral under-
standings, unless such co-operation or disclosure would be contrary to
significant national interests;
(4) to facilitate, through conclusion of or adherence to bilateral or multilat-
eral agreements or understandings, mutual administrative or judicial aid
in the field of restrictive business practices;
(5) whilst vigorously enforcing their legislation on restrictive business prac-
tices, to make use as far as possible ofthe OECD procedures on co-
operation between Member countries in the field of restrictive business
practices affecting international trade so as to facilitate consultation and
resolution of problems.
II. INSTRUCTS the Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices
to keep under review this Recommendation and to report to the Council
when appropriate.
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ANNEX 6: RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING
CO-OPERATION BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES ON RESTRICTIVE
BUSINESS PRACTICES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE
(Adopted by the Council at its 501st Meeting on 25th September, 1979)
The Council,
Having regard to Article 5(b) of the Convention on the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development of 14th December, 1960;
Having regard to the Recommendation of the Council of 5th October,
1967, concerning Co-operation between Member Countries on Restrictive
Business Practices Affecting International Trade [C(67)53(Final)];
Having regard to the Recommendation of the Council of 3rd July, 1973,
concerning a Consultation and Conciliation Procedure on Restrictive Busi-
ness Practices Affecting International Trade [C(73)99(Final)];
Having regard to the Note by the Committee of Experts on Restrictive
Business Practices on Co-operation between Member Countries on Restric-
tive Business Practices Affecting International Trade [C(79)154];
Recognising that restrictive business practices may constitute an obsta-
cle to the achievement of economic growth, trade expansion and other eco-
nomic goals of Member countries such as the control of inflation;
Recognising that the unilateral application of national legislation, in
cases where business operations in other countries are involved, raises
questions as to the respective spheres of sovereignty of the countries
concerned;
Recognising that restrictive business practices investigations and pro-
ceedings by one Member country may, in certain cases, affect important
interests of other Member countries;
Considering therefore that Member countries should co-operate in the
implementation of their respective national legislation in order to combat the
harmful effects of restrictive business practices;
Considering also that closer co-operation between Member countries is
needed to deal effectively with restrictive business practices operated by en-
terprises situated in Member countries when they affect the interests of one
or more other Member countries and have a harmful effect on international
trade;
Considering moreover that closer co-operation between Member coun-
tries in the form of notification, exchange of information, co-ordination of
action, consultation and conciliation, on a fully voluntary basis should be
encouraged, it being understood that such co-operation should not, in any
way, be construed to affect the legal positions of Member countries with
regard to questions of sovereignty, and in particular, the extra-territorial ap-
plication of laws concerning restrictive business practices, as may arise;
I. RECOMMENDS to the Governments of Member countries that insofar as
their laws permit:
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A. Notification, Exchange of Information and Co-ordination of Action
1.(a) when a Member country undertakes under its restrictive business
practices laws an investigation or proceeding involving important interests of
another Member country or countries, it should notify such Member country
or countries in a manner and at a time deemed appropriate, if possible in
advance and in any event at a time that would facilitate comments or consul-
tations; such advance notification would enable the proceeding Member
country, while retaining full freedom of ultimate decision, to take account of
such views as the other Member country may wish to express and of such
remedial action as the other Member country may find it feasible to take
under its own laws to deal with the restrictive business practices;
(b) where two or more Member countries proceed against a restrictive
business practice in international trade, they should endeavour to co-ordinate
their action insofar as appropriate and practicable;
2. through consultations or otherwise, the Member countries should
co-operate in developing or appying mutually satisfactory and beneficial mea-
sures for dealing with restrictive business practices in international trade. In
this connection, they should supply each other with such relevant informa-
tion on restrictive business practices as their legitimate interests permit them
to disclose; and should allow, subject to appropriate safeguards, including
those relating to confidentiality, the disclosure of information to the compe-
tent authorities of Member countries by the other parties concerned, whether
accomplished unilaterally or in the context of bilateral or multilateral under-
standings, unless such co-operation or disclosure would be contrary to sig-
nificant national interests.
B. CONSULTATION AND CONCILIATION
3.(a) a Member country that considers a restrictive business practice
investigation or proceeding being conducted by another Member country to
affect its important interests should transmit its views on the matter to or
request consultation with the other Member country;
(b) without prejudice to the continuation of its action under its restric-
tive business practices law and to its full freedom of ultimate decision, the
Member country so addressed should give full and sympathetic consideration
to the views expressed by the requesting country, and in particular to any
suggestions as to alternative means of fulfilling the needs or objectives of the
restrictive business practice investigation or proceedings;
4.(a) a Member country that considers that one or more enterprises
situated in one or more other Member countries are or have been engaged in
restrictive business practices of whatever origin that are substantially and
adversely affecting its interests may request consultation with such other
Member country or countries, recognising that the entering into such con-
sultations is without prejudice to any action under its restrictive business
practices law and to the full freedom of ultimate decision of the Member
countries concerned;
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(b) any Member country so addressed should give full and sympathetic
consideration to such views and factual materials as may be provided by the
requesting country and, in particular, to the nature of the restrictive business
practices in question, the enterprises involved and the alleged harmful ef-
fects on the interests of the requesting country;
(c) the Member country addressed which agrees that enterprises situ-
ated in its territory are engaged in restrictive business practices harmful to
the interests of the requesting country should attempt to ensure that these
enterprises take remedial action, or should itself take whatever remedial ac-
tion it considers appropriate, including actions under its legislation on restric-
tive business practices or administrative measures, on a voluntary basis and
considering its legitimate interests;
5. without prejudice to any of their rights, the Member countries in-
volved in consultations under paragraphs 3. or 4. above should endeavour to
find a mutually acceptable solution in the light of the respective interests
involved;
6. in the event of a satisfactory settlement of the consultations under
paragraphs 3. or 4. above, the requesting country, in agreement with, and in
the form accepted by, the Member country or countries addressed, should
inform the Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices of the
nature of the restrictive business practices in question and of the settlement
reached;
7. in the event that no satisfactory solution can be found, the Member
countries concemed, if they so agree, should submit the case to the Commit-
tee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices with a view to conciliation. If
the Member countries concerned agree to the use of another means of settle-
ment and do not therefore submit the case to the Committee they should, if
they consider it appropriate, inform the Committee of such features of the
settlement as they feel they can disclose.
II. INSTRUCTS the Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices:
1. to examine periodically the progress made in the implementation of
the provisions set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section I above;
2. to consider the reports submitted by Member countries in accor-
dance with paragraph 6 of Section I above;
3. to consider the requests for conciliation submitted by Member coun-
tries in accordance with paragraph 7 of Section I above and to assist, by of-
fering advice or by any other means, in the settlement of the case between the
Member countries concerned;
4. to report to the Council as appropriate on the application of the pres-
ent Recommendation.
III. DECIDES that this Recommendation repeals and supersedes the Re-
commendations of the Council of 5th October, 1967 and of 3rd July, 1973
referred to above.
